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Abstract. By analyzing high frequency data for the European interbank market, we
show that the intraday interest rate (implicitly deﬁned by the term structure of the ON
rate) jumped by more than ten times at the outset of the ﬁnancial turmoil in August 2007,
resulting in an ineﬃciency of the money market. This took place despite the provision of
unlimited free daylight overdrafts by the ECB, on a collateralized basis. We suggest that
such result may be attributed to an increase of the liquidity premium and of the cost of
collateral.
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11 Introduction
There is a broad consensus that the intraday interest rate should be set to zero on eﬃciency
grounds. In this work we document that, while in normal times money market rates are
roughly in line with this eﬃciency criterion, they may deviate by a large extent in a situation
of liquidity tension, like the one taking place at the outset of the subprime ﬁnancial turmoil.
We provide an analysis of the European electronic interbank market (e-MID) with high
frequency data, showing that the hourly interest rate − implicitly deﬁned by the intraday
pattern of the overnight rate − jumped by more than ten times (from 0.2 bp to 2.2 bp) in the
reserve maintenance period starting on August 8th 2007. This ﬁnding has no straightfoward
explanation, since the Eurosystem supplies intraday liquidity at no cost and without limit,
except for the collateral requirement.
We attribute this result to the sudden increase of the liquidity and credit risks taking
p l a c ea tt h eo u t s e to ft h eﬁnancial turmoil, with two likely consequences. First, in times of
liquidity crisis the intraday credit provided by the central bank is an imperfect substitute for
an early delivery of overnight funds. Then the market price of intraday liquidity incorporates
a liquidity premium, making it deviate from the cost of daylight central bank overdrafts.
Second, the widening of the spread between unsecured and secured interbank interest rates
implies an increase of the cost of collateral, making it more costly to get intraday credit from
the central bank. A stronger demand of collateral, in order to guarantee a larger amount of
available funds from the Eurosystem, has presumably contributed to making the collateral
requirement more costly.
Several recent contributions in monetary theory, focussing on the role of money as a
medium of exchange, point to the optimality of a zero intraday rate. For example, Zhou
(2000) distinguishes between "consumption/investment debt" and "settlement debt": since
2the latter does not aﬀect the inter-temporal allocation of resources, the intraday rate is just
a transaction cost which should be minimized. In Martin (2004) and Bhattacharya et al.
(2007) a zero level of the intraday rate is optimal since it provides an insurance for consumers
against liquidity shocks. Other works, more focussed on the mechanics of the payment
systems, stress that a positive cost of intraday liquidity may induce individual banks to
delay payments, putting a negative externality onto the banking system (see Angelini 1998,
Bech and Garratt 2003, Mills and Nesmith 2008, Martin and McAndrews 2008). The issue of
"delayed payments" have raised the concern of policymakers for its impact on the operational
risk in the payment systems (see FED 2006, 2007).
Overall, this literature shows that the market equilibrium may be ineﬃcient, since a
positive cost of intraday credit may emerge as a market outcome. This creates a role for the
active intervention of central banks, who are able to provide intraday liquidity at no cost.
Our work contributes to this literature by showing that during a liquidity crisis the ability
of the central bank to curb the (implicit) market price of intraday liquidity may be limited.
While the theory of the intraday interest rate is well developed, the empirical evidence
is scarce, due to the absence of an explicit market for intraday credit. The implicit intraday
rate has been estimated by Furﬁne (2001) for the federal funds market in the US and by
Baglioni and Monticini (2008) for the e-MID market in Europe: both point to a very low
level of the hourly rate (0.9 bp and 0.4 bp respectively) − although statistically signiﬁcant.
While the cost of intraday liquidity may be negligible under normal conditions, we show in
this work that it may gain economic signiﬁcance in times of liquidity tension, leading to an
ineﬃciency of the money market.
In the next section we provide the empirical evidence: after deﬁning the implicit intraday
interest rate, we document the striking rise taking place at the outset of the ﬁnancial crisis.
3In section 3 we discuss this result and we suggest a rationale for it. Some concluding remarks
are given in section 4. Finally, the Appendix extends the analysis to a longer time span, in
order to check for the robustness of our results.
2 The empirical evidence
2.1 The implicit intraday interest rate: deﬁnition
Following Baglioni and Monticini (2008), we consider an overnight (ON) interbank market
where all loans must be repaid at the same time next day. Thus the starting hour of a
contract (denoted by t) unambiguously determines the length of a loan (assuming real time
settlement). Then we may deﬁne the implicit hourly rate it simply by:
it = rt − rt+1 (1)
where rt is the ON interest rate observed in the market at time t. By estimating the term
structure of the ON rate (r0,r 1,...,rT,w h e r e0 and T are the market opening and closing
times respectively) we are able to provide an estimate of the hourly interest rate.
2.2 The data set
With 15 billion euros traded daily (on average) and 250 members from all over Europe and
the US, the Milan-based e-MID market is the major electronic marketplace for interbank
loans in the euro area. Trades start at 8 a.m. and ends up at 6 p.m., and they are settled in
real time through TARGET payments. All ON trades matures at the same time next day1.
1Trades involving only Italian banks are repaid at 9 a.m. next day, and trades involving international
banks mature by noon next day.
4The evidence presented here is based on all ON trades in the two reserve maintenance
periods: 7.11.2007 - 8.7.2007 and 8.8.2007 - 9.11.2007.2 As it is well known, the subprime
crisis hit the ﬁnancial markets on August 9th 2007, right at the beginning of the second
maintenance period here considered. We drop the last day in each period: we consider this
day as not informative, since the averaging facility3 is not available by deﬁnition, and this
m a k e st h i sd a yd i ﬀerent from all the others. The overall number of observations is 4,548 (of
which 2,550 in the second period4).
Figure 1 shows the sudden rise of the intraday volatility of the ON rate starting on
August 9th. Indeed, the average intraday standard deviation of the ON rate was 0.074 in
the second maintenance period considered, compared with a 0.008 in the previous one. This
goes together with a remarkable increase of day-to-day volatility: the standard deviation of
daily average rates goes from 0.01 in the ﬁrst period to 0.18 in the second one. Our interest
is focussed on intraday volatility: in the following, we shall try to see how this translates
into a rise of the intraday interest rate.
By the way, the average ON rate did not show any signiﬁcant change in the reserve
maintenance period starting on August 8th. In fact, the ON rate was on average 4.14 during
that maintenance period, while it was 4.08 during the previous one; however this diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant5.
2Our results are robust to an extension of the time span considered, as we show in the Appendix.
3The reserve requirement is applied to the average end-of-day balance held in reserve accounts over the
whole maintenance period, enabling banks to substitute the reserve of one day with that of some following day
(within each period). Of course, this stabilizing mechanism is not available in the last day of a maintenance
period.
4In this period August 15th has been dropped: this is a half-bank holiday, so very few trades are made.
5The null hypothesis H0 : rP1 = rP2 − where rP1 (rP2) is the ON average rate during the ﬁrst (second)
maintenance period considered − cannot be rejected both by the parametric Welch two sample t-test and
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Figure 1: The ON rate: tick-by-tick data
2.3 The jump of the intraday rate
We begin our analysis by dividing the business day into 9 hourly time bands: from 9 a.m. to
6p . m . 6,d e n o t e db yt =0 ,...8. For each business day, the average ON rate in each time band
has been computed, from which the average rate of the whole day has been subtracted: we
u s ei n t e r e s tr a t ed i ﬀerentials from the daily average (denoted by rt) in order to disentangle
intraday patterns − which are our focus − from day-to-day patterns of the ON rate.
We estimate the following equation (2) in the two reserve maintenance periods here
considered:
rt = c +
8 X
i=1
βi · xi + εt (2)
where xi are dummy variables − i stands for the hourly time bands following the ﬁrst one
6The ﬁrst operating hour (8 a.m. - 9 a.m.) has not been included in our analysis, since very few trades
take place at this time.
6− taking value 1 when t = i and zero otherwise; εt ∼ i.i.d.(0,σ 2
t) with possibly σ2
t 6= σ2
s
for t 6= s. The intercept c provides an estimate of the interest rate diﬀerential from the
daily average during the ﬁrst hourly band considered (9-10 a.m.). The values of the dummy
coeﬃcients βi provides an estimate of the diﬀerence between the ON rate in each time band
and the ON rate in the ﬁrst time band. Thus an estimate of the implicit hourly interest rate
it (deﬁned in eq.(1)) is provided by the consecutive changes (βi−βi+1) (−β1 for the ﬁrst time
band). The number of observations used in the regressions equals the number of business
days in each period times the number of hourly time bands: 19 · 9=1 7 1and 23 · 9=2 0 7
for the ﬁrst and second period respectively.
The regression analysis provides quite strong results − s h o w ni nT a b l e1 . D u r i n gt h e
second period the estimated hourly interest rate is larger than in the previous period in all
time bands; the mean hourly rate jumps from 0.2 bp to 2.2 bp.A l l c o e ﬃcients are highly
signiﬁcant (with the exception of β1 in the second period, due to high volatility in this hourly
band). The standard errors have been obtained by heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) covariance matrix estimators (see Andrews and Monahan 1992).
In Figure 2 the ﬁtted values of equation (2) are plotted − based on the estimated para-
m e t e r ss h o w ni nT a b l e1− for the ﬁrst period considered (dotted line) and for the second
one (solid line): each line provides a view of the intraday term structure of the ON interest
rate − expressed as a diﬀerential from the daily average − in each period. The diﬀerence
between the two periods is striking. Before the crisis the term structure is quite ﬂat: the
ON rate remains within a range of ±1 bp from the daily average. During the crisis the term
structure is much steeper: the ON rate is almost 10 bp above the daily average in the ﬁrst
hour; then it steadily declines until reaching at the end of day a level 8 bp lower than the
daily average. This implies − for example − that borrowing overnight at 9.30 a.m. costs
7about 18 bp more than borrowing at 5.30 p.m.
Table 1 - The estimated intraday rate before and during the crisis
July 11th - August 6th August 8th - September 10th
Time band Coeﬃcient Value in bp βi − βi+1 Value in bp βi − βi+1












































Adj.R2 =0 .34 Mean = 0.21 Adj.R2 =0 .21 Mean = 2.19
D.W. =1 .87 D.W. =1 .66
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance level respectively, based on HAC
standard errors (shown in parenthesis).
3 Interpreting our results
As it is well known, the intraday interest rate is crucially aﬀected by the cost of daylight
















































Figure 2: The switch of the ON intraday term structure
two alternatives: (i) borrow immediately in the interbank ON market, (ii) obtain intraday
credit from the central bank and borrow later (say at 4 p.m.) in the ON market. If these
two alternatives were perfect substitutes, such bank would not be willing to pay an implicit
intraday interest charge (resulting from the diﬀerence between the ON rates at 9 a.m. and
at 4 p.m.) larger than the cost of a seven hour loan from the central bank. This is the reason
why the cost of daylight liquidity provided by the central bank may be seen as an upper
bound for the implicit intraday interest rate, at least under normal conditions.
Consequently we have two candidate (not alternative) explanations for the jump of the
intraday interest rate that we have documented in this work. First, the two above alternatives
are not perfect substitutes, particularly in times of liquidity tension. Second, the cost of
intraday credit from the central bank has increased during the ﬁnancial crisis. Let us examine
them in turn.
There is a widely accepted evidence that the ﬁnancial turmoil beginning in August 2007
produced a remarkable increase of the liquidity risk perceived by the participants in the
money market; in particular, the uncertainty on the availability of funds in the interbank
9market grew substantially7. In such circumstances a risk averse bank might have a strict
preference for borrowing early in the ON market rather than wait and borrow later (relying
in the meantime on the intraday liquidity from the central bank), in order to make sure that
she has enough funds to achieve her end-of-day targeted liquidity position. If this is the
case, the intraday liquidity provided by the central bank is not a perfect substitute for an
anticipated delivery of ON funds. That’s why a borrowing bank might be ready to pay an
implicit intraday interest rate higher than the cost of central bank daylight credit. In other
words, she is willing to pay a liquidity premium on an ON loan delivered early in the day.
A symmetric argument applies to a bank long of liquidity, taking into account that the
random ﬂow of payments makes her end-of-day liquidity position a stochastic variable; this
source of uncertainty is stronger early in the day and it vanishes towards the closing time of
business. A bank might prefer to delay lending in the ON market, since by lending early she
bears the risk that, in case of need, she will not be able to get an interbank loan later in the
day. Then she may want to charge a liquidity premium for lending early in the ON market.
Coming to the second explanation, we have to remember that the ECB does not charge
any fee on intraday credit; the only cost comes from the collateral requirement. There is
some evidence that the cost of collateral increased sharply since the beginning of the ﬁnancial
crisis. At the same time, the demand of collateral became stronger, making eligible securities
become a scarce resource: this may have contributed to increasing the cost of satisfying the
collateral requirement.
Ar e l i a b l em e a s u r eo ft h ec o s to fc o l l a t e r a li sh a r dt oﬁnd out. If a bank has to borrow
eligible securities, she incurs in an explicit cost. However if a bank holds eligible securities in
7The jump of the spread between the three-month Euribor and the T-Bill rate (or the Eonia swap rate)
is usually taken as an indicator of liquidity hoarding and of weak money market activity. See ECB (2007,
2008) for detailed information.
10her portfolio, she bears only an opportunity cost, provided such securities have an alternative
use in the ﬁnancial market (this is true for government bonds, for example). If a bank is
able to use as collateral securities which are not accepted in the market (like ABS), even the
opportunity cost is absent.
Nonetheless, a tentative way to measure the cost of collateral is provided by the Euribor-
Eurepo spread8. On one hand, a bank may "borrow" eligible securities through a buy and
sell back transaction, earning the interbank secured interest rate (Eurepo); it has to fund
the deal by borrowing at the unsecured interbank rate (Euribor): in such a case the spread
is a measure of the explicit cost of collateral. On the other hand, a bank holding government
bonds and using them as collateral with the ECB gives up a proﬁt opportunity, namely using
such bonds to borrow money at the repo rate and lend at the higher unsecured rate: in such
a case the spread is a measure of the opportunity cost of collateral.
The evidence points to a remarkable increase of the Euribor-Eurepo spread across the
two reserve maintenance periods here considered. The average three-month spread goes from
7.6 bp before the liquidity crisis to 51.6 bp during the crisis9; the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant10. The main reason behind this jump has presumably to be found in the higher
credit risk perceived by market participants. Whatever its origin, the widening of the spread
implies a higher cost of collateral.
As far as the demand of collateral is concerned, a measure is provided by the amount
of eligible securities deposited at the Eurosystem. This is usually quite stable: it remained
8Euribor and Eurepo are indexes of the interbank interest rates in the euro area, unsecured and secured
respectively. They are provided by the European Banking Federation and are based on the information
provided by a panel of prime banks. See http://www.eurepo.org/ for detailed information and for daily
data.
9Standard deviations are 1.2 and 15.6 respectively. The two means are statistically signiﬁcant (based on
two tails t-test).
10The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected both by the parametric Welch two sample t-test and by
the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test at the 1% level.
11around 1,000 billions euros during the ﬁrst seven months of 2007, with only minor changes.
In August 2007 the amount deposited increased by roughly 20%, and by another 20% during
the last four months of the year (reaching a level above 1,400 billions by year-end)11.T h i s
increase has been due to the need of relying on the liquidity provided by the central bank,
given the diﬃculties and the uncertainty in raising liquidity in the market. The ECB has
been very active in providing liquidity, in order to restore normal conditions in the money
market: the frequency and the amounts of interventions increased dramatically (see ECB
2008 for a full description); this in turn induced banks to deposit more collateral.
Summing up, the sudden increase of the liquidity and credit risks taking place at the
outset of the ﬁnancial crisis has apparently had a signiﬁcant impact on the implicit intraday
interest rate. A direct eﬀect may be identiﬁed in the liquidity premium for the early delivery
of funds in the ON interbank market, making the market price of intraday liquidity get
higher than the cost of a daylight overdraft from the central bank. An indirect eﬀect may
be seen in the increased cost of collateral, making it more costly to get intraday credit from
the central bank.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown that at the outset of the "sub-prime ﬁnancial turmoil" (August 2007) the
implicit hourly interest rate in the euro area money market jumped by more than ten times,
reaching a remarkable level: borrowing overnight early in the morning would cost 18 bp more
than borrowing late in the afternoon. We suggest that this evidence may be attributed to
an increase of the liquidity premium and of the cost of collateral. These two rationales have
only been discussed here; a deeper analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and it is left
11See data at http://www.ecb.int/stats/payments/securities/html/coll1.en.html.
12to future research.
The theory and practice of central banking point to the need of a supply of daylight
credit by the central banks, aiming at keeping the price of intraday liquidity as close to
zero as possible. However, this kind of intervention creates a credit exposure of central
banks, who react by implementing some protective measures like: caps, fees, or collateral.
Several studies12 compare the relative costs and beneﬁts of such measures; there is a growing
consensus that the collateral requirement is the most eﬃcient solution13. Our evidence shows
that, in a situation of liquidity stress, even the provision of free daylight overdrafts − on a
collateralized basis − m a yb eu n a b l et op r e v e n tt h em a r k e tp r i c eo fi n t r a d a yl i q u i d i t yf r o m
reaching quite a high level.
Appendix
In this appendix we check whether the evidence provided in this work is robust to
an extension of the time period considered. We estimate equation (2) over the time span
including the four reserve maintenance periods ending on August 7th 2007, and we estimate
equation (2) again over the four maintenance periods starting on August 8th 2007. The
number of observations is 75·9=675 and 84·9=756 respectively. As it can be seen from Table
2, the above results are conﬁrmed, although the jump of the intraday interest rate is smaller:
the estimated mean hourly rate during the liquidity crisis is 5.7 times larger than in the
previous period.
A further check has been done, by regressing equation (2) over the time span including
the three reserve maintenance periods ending on July 10th 2007, and by regressing equation
12Some have been mentioned in the Introduction. See also Mills (2006), Furﬁne and Stehm (1998), Lacker
(1997).
13This has been implemented in Europe, but not in the U.S.: instead of applying a collateral requirement,
the Fed charges an explicit fee on daylight credit. See http://www.ecb.int/paym/coll/html/ and McAndrews
- Rajan (2000) for detailed information on the euro area and the U.S. respectively.
13(2) again over the three maintenance periods starting on September 12th 2007. This exercise
enables us to check whether the impact of the liquidity crisis on the intraday interest rate
does not vanish after the ﬁrst maintenance period during the crisis. To save space, we do
not show the results in detail in a separate table, but we limit to say that the estimated
mean hourly rate after the liquidity shock is 4.1 times larger than before14.
Table 2 - The estimated intraday rate over an expanded time span
April 18th - August 6th August 8th - December 10th
Time band Coeﬃcient Value in bp βi − βi+1 Value in bp βi − βi+1












































Adj.R2 =0 .16 Mean = 0.26 Adj.R2 =0 .19 Mean = 1.43
D.W. =1 .75 D.W. =1 .61
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote 10%, 5%, 1% signiﬁcance level respectively, based on HAC
standard errors (shown in parenthesis).
14Of course, regression results are available upon request.
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